A comment to Paul Marshall's Opinion on the FT about Central Banks seeing beyond inflation

In response to this article http://t.co/vZKJRdXm on the FT my take:

There are two routes not mutually exclusive but complimentary at redistributing wealth from creditors to debtors: 1- The pursuit of increased inflationary expectations & 2- Debt forgiveness. It is inevitable that both will ultimately be chosen to improve the faltering household balance sheets and regenerate consumer demand. Central banks, like in Japan's case, should embrace higher inflationary expectations but more importantly structure a mechanism that will work equitably towards the path to debt forgiveness.



Η απάντηση μου σε άρθρο του Κυρίου Βαρουφάκη στο Protagon

1-Οτιδήποτε μειώνει το χρέος μας χωρίς να αυξάνει τις υποχρεώσεις μας είναι θετικό. Μπορεί κάτω από 20 δισ ευρώ μείωση να σας φαίνεται άνευ ουσίας αλλά για εσάς φαίνεται πως το χρήμα δεν έχει πλέον αξία. Μην υποτιμάτε οπιαδήποτε μείωση.

2- Η μείωση μας φέρνει πιο κοντά στην βιωσιμότητα του χρέους καθώς εκτός των άλλων οι αποδόσεις των ομολόγων μας υποχωρούν.

3-Οι τράπεζες όταν έχουν σύνολο 15 δισ στο χαρτοφυλάκιο τους πως κουρέυονται με 14 δισ, όπως λέτε, όταν το χρέος τους αγοράζεται με 35%; Μάλλον λάθος κάνετε. Πρώτον οι τράπεζες αγόρασαν τα ομόλογα που κατέχουν κάτω από την τιμή που τους προσφέρεται άρα έχουν και όφελος από την πώληση.ΔΕΝ ΚΟΥΡΕΥΕΤΑΙ ΚΑΝΕΝΑ ΚΑΙΝΟΥΡΓΙΟ ΠΟΣΟ.Το μόνο που χάνουν είναι την υπεραξία σε μία ενδεχόμενη μελλοντική  άνοδο των τιμών των ομολόγων. Γιαυτό θα ήταν εύλογο η συμμετοχή των ξένων στην επαναγορά να είναι μεγάλη έτσι ώστε οι Ελληνικές τράπεζες να συμμετάσχουν με μικρότερο ποσοστό για να επωφεληθούν από την βελτίωση της μελλοντικής αξιοπιστίας της Ελλάδας. Ούτως η άλλως οι τράπεζες μπορούν εφόσον το επιθυμούν να ξαναμπούν στην αγορά να τα επαναγοράσουν.


Buying up Greek government debt

It has been suggested that the Eurozone might look at the possibility of loaning the Greek government an amount as high as 10 billion euros via the ESM or otherwise  to purchase Greek government debt at a discount in the market and retire it. This could reduce Greek debt by approximately 20 billion plus accruable interest if this exercise is carried out at today's market rates close to 35% of face for 10 year maturities. The benefit would of course be greater for longer maturities as it would trade at a greater discount.

There have been some sounding comments by various bloggers as to whether owners of Greek debt may be willing to part with their holdings at these depressingly low prices and of course many others acknowledging it would be mere stupidity and that under this spectrum it is futile as no one will sell at these levels. 

Prices of Greek government bonds are determined on a daily basis by continuously changing market dynamics at bond dealing rooms at banks & other financial intermediaries. The current price ( if its 35% of face for 10 year instruments) is therefore a price at which willing buyers and sellers exchange these as of this writing. The fact the EZ may pre-announce the possibility of such a program implies that market expectations automatically will shift & improve and thus market participants may only now be willing to sell their holdings at continually higher prices automatically lowering yields and improving Greece's borrowing costs. As prices rise the Greek government pays more for its own debt that it buys and thus the bond holders also receive more so the effective government gain is reduced but equally Greece's position in the market improves. 

It is therefore nonsensical to suggest, as some have, that there will be no sellers simply because prices will rise to the level that sellers will become willing. There is of course the possibility of prices rising by such an amount as to make the whole exercise futile, but then the Greek government would have benefited by considerably lowering its debt yields without having spent one penny.

This is a measure long overdue.   


My comments on Krugman's post http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/01/euro-counterfactuals-wonkish/?smid=tw-NytimesKrugman&seid=auto#comments

Capital flows from the core to the periphery induced by low interest rates, low inflationary expectations, a misconception of a globalised & perpetually growing world economy, all unquestionably contributed to the worsening of the trade imbalances in the periphery. What the euro achieved was to significantly worsen the trade imbalances which periphery countries were already experiencing. The chart below is a case in point for Spain. The same would apply for the rest of the GIPSIIS.
Historical Data Chart


On the devaluation front if wages were the instrumental factor affecting trade imbalances I would agree but it is a lot more than this. Each country has its own comparative advantages and it must thus allocate resources to highlight these advantaged sectors. This way it creates import substitution and also advances its export sector. In countries such as Greece were the inefficient and corrupt government sector still controls a large share of GDP, efforts should be directed at privatising as a source of efficiency, as a way to reduce debt  as well as an injection of much needed scarce capital. Finally a protagonist role must also be played by the surplus countries whose economies benefited the most by the euro. They must increase local consumption through government and or private initiative so as to absorb increased imports from the periphery and contribute to rebalancing. The consequential loss of domestic sales can be made up by the fruits of their new investments in the productive process in the periphery. Even more to their liking if their investments are centred in export oriented industries they will do what they have been doing so successfully at home knowing that their effort stabilises their existence.


A comment on Krugman's post http://t.co/cjajR3v5

I do agree that the Euro problem is mainly a BOP one which has since transformed into a major fiscal problem as a result of the deepening economic downturn and the sudden shut down of low interest capital flows on which the peripheral countries were so much dependent.

In this respect, the peripheral countries should redirect resources both public and private to the production of goods and services aimed for both local consumption to replace imports and the export market to sustain growth in earnings.If this can be accelerated through the privatisation process it should be done for as long as the investor has a viable long term investment plan in place to create a product and or service which can compete in terms of quality and price in Internatioanal markets.

Equally redundant public sector services which do not add anything to this creative process should be shut down or transformed into production units for its furtherance.

The surplus countries on the other hand should strive to increase consumption thereby accelerate the absorption of imports and provide investment capital and know how to the periphery to incentivise their production.

This will also allow the substitution of part or all of their total exports lost to imports in their local market to exports from the periphery.


My response to questions related to my economic suggestions

1: “Greece needs a simple tax system” – How is the current system failing? Is it predominantly an issue of changing the rates or one of compliance?

One of Greece’s favorite pastimes is inventing ways for tax avoidance. Why is it that Greeks are so repelled by the fair contribution of proportionate taxation attributable to their economic activity? I will list a number of the more important reasons for brevity’s sake which will provide a compelling explanation to this phenomenon:

1-      The perception, borne out by reality, that government is corrupt and most of the taxes collected will not go towards a socially responsible cause but to serve the interests of politicians and the rest of the public bureaucracy. 

2-      The tax system has over the years been constructed in such an unprofessional and short sighted fashion that it has become a maze, as each year’s tax brigade passes bills to extinguish each specific year’s fires without an overall strategy geared to predetermined objectives. This has meant that investors, corporates, households are in a constant state of uncertainty as the tax system is altered to capture some inadvertent shortfall. In such an environment tax payers are always on the defensive in anticipation of the unexpected.

3-      The system in its current form is incentivized in favor of tax avoidance. On a household level it’s based on the method of inferred income as a means of assessing tax liability over and above  annually declared income What this effectively means is that the government taxes households on the aggregate of their lifestyle activities and holdings if this is above the earned declared income. If this sounds more complicated its because it is. If I live in an apartment of a certain size I will be taxed on the inferred income for choosing to live in that apartment irrespective of whether  I earn this income or not. The same principle applies to owning a car, having a cleaning lady in your household employ, having a pool in your house (this may be justified but is this a way to run the finances of a country?) or would you believe paying for a mortgage and this system works progressively to higher incomes dependent on the degree of your aggregated lavish lifestyle; the list goes on. It is one way you may say of capturing the tax evaders but it’s not an equitable system, it is an indirect blackmail on the tax payer and of course assumes that Greek society in its entirety is crooked thus driving it to self-fulfillment. Let me expand a little on the mortgage payment so that you can get a perspective of how unjust this is. Assuming you have decided to invest your hard earned savings by buying a property in Greece and that you would need a mortgage for that purpose. Not only can’t you not offset your interest expense against your income (but to a very small %tge, 10% if it’s your first property) but the total monthly mortgage payment is considered inferred income. In other words the tax authorities assume that if you have money to pay for this mortgage you must also have the commensurate income and you will be taxed on it. Imagine now that you lose your job and you have no means of paying for your mortgage (This is what has been happening in the private sector in Greece. Close to one million jobs have been lost) not only are you in a dire economic situation but you are required to pay income tax on non-existent income. To make a long story shorter if ever the word labyrinth was a Greek invention it applies aptly to the current Greek tax system

4-      Finally let me just touch upon the property market as its downturn has contributed to a large extent to the Greek economic depression.

Because tax authorities have been unable and unwilling to find a system that would work efficiently they decided to overtax the property market to such an extent as to literally kill the market and anything associated with it. Purchase tax for a property built prior to 2006 together with ancillary costs, lawyers’, notary’s fees etc. amounts to a range between 11-12% of the contract price. For properties built after 2006 the tax paid is VAT currently at 23% plus fees. If you own a property you pay an annual wealth tax  on the objective value of your property close to 1per mille. Moreover, the one off payment or levy payable on Electricity bills which is now expected to remain for a second year is an additional amount ranging, depending on location and thus value of the property, between 3-16 euros a square meter. The system therefore penalizes the prudent saver who may also be unemployed and unable to pay these sums. Finally, rental income is taxed at the 45% level without any allowance for offsetable expenses.  

All this taxation has caused a collapse in demand for properties and has brought one of the largest engines of growth in Greece to a standstill. It has also been suicidal for the government as it has killed off the value of a market it relies upon to sell some of its prized property possessions.

For argument’s sake let me suggest a solution.  A low enough tax rate (say a maximum of 5%) on property, fixed for a duration of at least 15 years secured by constitutional law will for example provide enough incentive to declare the true value of property transactions without recourse to Objective values ( the Official values set by the government on which all transactions are based and taxed. Initially set at low levels but now surpass market values). This will revitalize the property market, substantially increase private investment in property and related sectors, reduce unwarranted corrupt tax bureaucracy and thus the deficit. A growth oriented policy made in Greece.

2: “Greece needs to promote foreign direct investment” – At a time when the economy is contracting sharply, how can the country hope to attract international capital? Would it involve redefining the timeframe of the troika’s austerity demands?

Firstly let me tackle both your questions and then expand on my suggestion. Reversing the economy’s decline should be part of the overall strategy of this government. I do not aspire to the notion that there cannot be any foreign direct investment because the economy is contracting. On the contrary it is in times of austerity that values decline and investors are able to pick up assets attractively, provided of course the government undertakes policy measures which over time create the basis for sustainable growth. The argument so often used by most opposition parties that this would be a fire sale of government assets is fallible as those processes can easily incorporate participation on the upside earnings and or sale price that may result from the running of the privatized company. It is true to say furthermore, that there is active, keen interest in the candidate companies for privatization even in today’s economic climate of profound uncertainty.  

There is no doubt in anyone’s mind that the world’s best second home property locations can be found in Greece. Whether those are on popular island retreats or on forgotten coves amidst the pines of the Peloponnese or some other magical exploit, Greece’s wealth is waiting to be shared.

 If the government therefore, embarks on a privatization program with enough incentives to attract both foreign direct investment but also capital for private investment this contraction can quickly swing to growth.

The Troika asks for a reduction in the deficit to manageable levels. What does this mean? It means that this government must immediately cut government spending to bring about such a result. This may imply increased redundancies in state run companies something which should have been carried out from the very beginning. Instead the government at the time, to protect the public sector and its votes, chose to raise taxes across the board, cut salaries and pensions thereby feeding austerity without solving the underlying problem. Greece turned a deficit into an austerity problem by refusing to cut government fat and I may add is even today cornering itself by vociferously protecting the employment of public sector employees at the expense of the battle worn private sector employee. Not only is this bad economics but more importantly unethical.

On the merits of privatizations I think my argument is self-evident but if you so wish I can expand on a separate blog.

Summarizing though privatizations:

a-      Lower government deficit and thus market interest rates and increase market confidence.

b-      Inject much wanted liquidity into the system.

c-       Increase tax receipts as companies are run more efficiently and

d-      Reduce embedded corrupt practices probably the biggest obstacle to unleashing private initiative in Greece.

 3: “Greece has to reduce or shut down redundant public companies” – What effect would this have on unemployment? Public sector reform may be necessary but without a growing private sector could it simply compound the problem?

In Greece there is an enormous amount of corruption stemming from the inability to implement any of the laws that have been legislated by parliament. This is a matter to discuss in my next assertion and Greece’s most pressing problem but what is relevant under this section is that public companies and or institutions are the breeding ground for such corruption. Whether those are Hospitals, Utilities, Universities, Planning authorities, Tax offices, Municipalities, take your pick. The explanation for this is clear without recourse to regulation or punishment these masterful conjurers manage their powerful positions by enriching themselves and their families. A recent revelation of a court employee with 9 million euros on deposit and many properties in her name resulted in her being dismissed from her position. There has so far been no announcement for seizure of her assets or an inquiry into the matter. If this is the response to the enrichment of a junior court employee the mind boggles on the magnitude and response to senior level employees.

My point therefore is that the public sector is colluding to resist shrinkage for obvious reasons and many of these bodies provide nothing tangible, if anything many of them produce headwinds on the ever declining and value creating private sector. Ask any Greek citizen about his day to day engagement with a public employee.  This is particularly true for entities set up for the sole purpose of securing the dedicated votes of their faithful flock.

I submit therefore that contrary to Keynesian dogma, in Greece’s case the Public Sector is one of the roots of Greece’s problem and must be contained to provide room for more productive forces to take hold and more importantly to cut the deficit.  

With this said there are Public companies which for strategic and other purposes must remain public and there are public employees who have been doing an admirably efficient job unscathed by the tempting voices of the sirens. These people must be rewarded adequately commensurate with their public service.

In answer to your question therefore, we have so far seen an increase in private sector unemployment, now running close to 1 million, because successive Greek governments demanded, for reasons outlined above, the preservation of the employment of the public sector. There will clearly be an increase in unemployment with the reduction in public employment but if incentives for private investment are introduced on a permanent basis and the government embarks in an extroversion trip this will rapidly be erased by the dynamics of private enterprise.

Greece’s legal system must be simplified, protected and enforced” – Do you have any particular areas in mind that require simplification? Are there any particular groups who have avoided scrutiny by the legal system to date?

I do not profess to know the workings of Greece’s legal system; all I know is that it reflects the epitome of bureaucratic practices under one roof. From the time it takes for cases to be heard in court or rescheduled, to the processes involved all require patience and perseverance by all involved.

I believe Greece’s problems stem from the unwillingness by the system to enforce the law and when it does it is so cumbersome and longwinded that the end result does not necessarily justify the effort. For democracy to work efficiently and effectively the justice system must endorse and uphold its values. It is the knowledge that corruption will remain unpunished which breeds corruption in every level of everyday living.


Reinventing the role of the corporation

It is quite interesting to highlight the limits of industrialisation in today’s economic environment and how this may hamper future growth prospects but more importantly I feel is to address the possible economic model which may form the foundation for the workings of the world’s economies.
It is evident that the growth model which was based on the short sighted vision of maximisation of profits through the corporate identity as represented by its shareholders and its executive arm is no longer able to provide the basis for the creation of wealth in an equitable and collective way. It became progressively more reliant on the extension of the business cycle both through the furtherance of the globalisation process and increased merchanting of trade but equally through the enormous leveraging of corporates and households based on unfounded expectations of endless growth and fuelled of course by the ever decreasing long term and short term interest rates with the blessing of the ever supportive central banks. The resultant inevitable collapse of this house of cards left US households with negative equity and an inability to drive final demand, sovereigns constrained by fiscal overextension either in an attempt to keep their economies from falling over the cliff or because they have been undertaking fiscal austerity as a precondition for good housekeeping and created record wealth and income inequality the result of a miscued process of distribution amidst an unfavourable tax system.
So what has been the catalyst for this current state of affairs and how could we put an end to this pessimism and the inability of both fiscal and monetary policy to affect current economic activity and ultimately growth and employment. Joe Stiglitz has been fervently pointing out how income & wealth inequality is exacerbating the situation and how an equitable redistribution process in some form or another can rescue the economy. I couldn’t agree more but I would suggest that the most efficient way to do this is to alter the corporate model.


A reply to an emotional blogger

R. G. Danon
Greece does not need compassion it needs a clear vision and a road map to prosperity. Unfortunately, the vested corrupt interests of the few have resulted in policy decisions with disastrous effects for the country and its citizens. It is not the implementation of the evil Troika directives but unequivocally misplaced Greek government choices of where to cut and whom to tax. When this selection had the inevitable depressive outcome, politicians blamed the Troika, the ultimate scapegoat.
Greece needs to understand its problems, a made in Greece unsustainable deficit which was condoned long enough to nurture a second monster in the way of its debt. Both of these are clearly successive Greek government creations being blessed of course by the easy money of the EU.
As masters of our own predicament and beneficiaries of unprecedented debt forgiveness, we need to ask ourselves what is the road to restoration, embracing EZ membership in a world economic environment hostile to new initiatives.
1- Greece needs a simple tax system which punishes tax avoidance and evasion not based on Objective (miscued) values or Inferred income which are both subject to increased bureaucracy and distortions. A system conducive to the promotion of private investment.
2- Greece needs to become extraverted to promote foreign direct investment because it’s highly expansionary and deficit reducing particularly through the process of privatizations. To claim this would be a fire sale of Greek government assets is a complete misrepresentation of facts playing to the aspirations of political demagoguery and private interests.
3- Greece has to reduce and shut down redundant public companies created for no other purpose but to gain politicaly leveraged votes, a major misallocation of scarce resources.
4- Above all Greece’s legal system must be simplified protected and enforced in every aspect of everyday life. The notion that illegal behavior remains unpunished is the incubator of corruption.First & foremost though Greek politicians need to take this initiative by abolishing immunity, as the minutest symbolism of the sacrifices demanded of its people.
Greece can. Will it?


A short blog explaining Greece to a follower

Greece’s popular uprising takes aim at the austerity measures undertaken by the previous government in trying to bring Greece’s finances under control. These have to a large extent been dictated by the Troika, the EC, ECB and the IMF as to the size of reduction in deficit or addition to revenue however, without reference to the mix those policy measures might take. Greece is currently running a budget deficit of around 10% of GDP and a debt to GDP ratio of around 150% after the recent haircuts.  

Unfortunately, the previous government imposed the simplest form of implementation but probably also the harshest, reducing pensions and salaries in the public sector and increasing taxes across the board. This resulted in a severe contraction in economic activity and brought what little dynamism Greece’s economy had to a standstill. Unemployment in the private sector increased dramatically whilst revenues from higher taxes did not have the desired effect as the economy contracted. At the same time the budget deficit although initially contracted reversed direction as  government was unwilling to reduce its bloated size falling hostage to  its own predicament. Equally banks stopped lending as it became apparent that they were insolvent thereby accelerating the contraction.

Instead of putting blame therefore on their own incompetency and inadequate half measures, politicians blamed the Troika and the signed Memorandum of understanding which had an aim at deregulating markets and creating a more competitive environment for entrepreneurial Greece.   

So coming back to your two points laying blame on the greedy banks and or the lazy protesters unwilling to forego their hard won privileges my comments are:

1-      As far as banks are concerned Greeks have never really identified them as the cause of their problems only in as much as they form part of the world financial system which was to blame for the initial financial crisis. To a large extent Greek banks did not participate in this frenzy of lending which was commensurate with the crisis, if anything the banks were quite prudent in their lending practices. The mistake was that they were forced to invest in Greek government bonds as a gesture of solidarity, a quid pro quo, a token for their existence. This meant that as these securities were marked down by more than 50% owing to the well documented haircut, they became insolvent as banks had a very large proportion of their assets invested in them. It was the spendthrift government that brought down the banks as opposed to the banks creating the problem in countries like Spain, Ireland and of course the US.

2-      In the case of lazy protesters there is a lot of truth to this assertion. Over the course of the last three decades we had to a large extent a socialist government run by PASOK with a manifesto of deficit spending and promises of increased electoral public employment in exchange for votes. The centre right NEW DEMOCRACY party also lay claim and embraced this modus operandi effectively condoning this behaviour. This was effortlessly carried out as Greece was the beneficiary of very low interest rates courtesy of the Euro and the party euphoria that ensued having no regard to the longer term structural imbalances prevalent throughout this period. Equally, massive transfers of wealth occurred to help the periphery catch up with the core. It goes without saying that this money did not find a home in productive investment but rather in excessive consumption, lavish living and Swiss and local bank accounts. Europe turned a blind eye as it was in many ways easier. At some point Greece had to pay the ferry man. Lending seized and the Troika imposed its lending conditions. The problem is this bloated Government sector of spoilt (un)public servants has never been cut to size, a large part of which earn excessive salaries, a large part of which is totally redundant and of course is being maintained at the expense of the private sector which in neglect is being asked to pay an ever increasing share of taxes. It is self-evident that this process has a dead end and we have reached it.

This  is what is currently happening in Greece.  I hope it is of some use


Catastrophic Credibility

Catastrophic Credibility

By Paul Krugman

A little while ago Ben Bernanke responded to suggestions that the Fed needed to do more — in particular, that it should raise the inflation target — by insisting that this would undermine the institution’s “hard-won credibility”. May I say that what recent events in Europe, and to some extent in the US, really suggest is that central banks have too much credibility? Or more accurately, their credibility as inflation-haters is very clear, while their willingness to tolerate even as much inflation as they say they want, let alone take some risks with inflation to rescue the real economy, is very much in doubt.
Yesterday I pointed to the German breakeven, a measure of euro area inflation expectations, which has plunged lately. Here’s a longer view:
Note the peak in April 2011. It wasn’t very high; slightly above the ECB’s target, but arguably still too low to make the needed adjustment within the euro area feasible. Nonetheless, the ECB raised rates — and that was when the euro really began falling apart. The direct effects of the rate increase can’t explain that unraveling, but the effect on expectations — aha, so they really are that fanatical about price stability! — can.
Now the breakeven is plunging. I’d like to think that the ECB is holding frantic meetings and planning to announce a surprise sharp rate cut, preferably to zero, the day after tomorrow. But I doubt it. The fact is that the ECB is highly credible: most observers, me included, are quite sure that it is totally allergic to inflation and relatively indifferent to the collapse of the real economy.
The Fed has conveyed a milder form of the same message, issuing forecasts that show inflation slightly below target and unemployment far above target; given its dual mandate, this should be a flashing siren calling for more action. Yet these forecasts have been accompanied by statements to the effect that no action is currently called for. The Fed has therefore created the credible expectation that it will move only if inflation is far below the claimed target, and doesn’t really care about unemployment.
My earnest hope is that both central banks will rethink the meaning of credibility, and in particular what kind of credibility they really want to have, very soon. And by very soon I basically mean tomorrow.

And my response:

  • RGDanon
  • Greece

  • Authorities have three choices:
    1- Go through many years of austerity and or growth enhancing policies to reduce both deficits and debt to sustainable levels a very long process of perseverence.
    2-Central banks abandon their narrow mindedness and allow inflationary EXPECTATIONS (it is this variable expectations, that is important to trigger demand side incentives)
    3-Even more importantly design a process to redistribute wealth to households by increasing motgage debt forgiveness and thus wealth, allowing for increased final demand as net worth and prosperity values rise.
    In summary, it is a function of transfering wealth from creditors to debtors. If this process is not accelerated then it will be imposed by market forces and or political and ultimately social repercussions. This effectively, is what is currently happening in Greece.
    It goes without saying that a combination of all is also another desirable mix.


    Inflation credibility and debt forgiveness

    If Central Banks are so averse to heightened inflationary expectations in order to protect their proclaimed and hard won spoils of battle then another way to tackle the consumer demand problem is to direct efforts at the heart of the problem. Households still suffering from their indebted balance sheets should through a combination of government financed programs and financial industry initiative agree on a level of debt forgiveness. It should be remembered that the tax payer saved Wall Street salaries and bonuses and it is high time for payback. A small attempt at redistributing wealth in order to provide/ create a healthier footing to the US Economy at large.  


    The Dilemma

    Clearly there is a very reasoned response to those who wish to find blame on the current state of Greece’s predicament. The road to perdition is long and really at this stage not worth delving in.

    Ultimately though the dilemma boils down to what type of a future does the Hope generation wish to have in its pursuit of the ray of light at the end of the long tunnel?

    1-Will youth opt to become part of the current corrupt system of public (dis)service, a life of zero expectations and the abuse of tax payer money, a system abandoned by all mature societies or will

    2- The Hope generation enter a world where government becomes its guiding torch, where it does not need to tax the future of the next generation to sustain its current existence, where the rule of law works efficiently for all its citizens, where its political system is socially sensitive and not self-serving, where it is able to unleash the power of individual creativity adding value to its community & society.

    The real question therefore confounding Hellenes is which world they aspire to live in.